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Oceans Report
BURT L. SAUNDERS*

The Eighth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) convened in Geneva on March 19,
1979, under the leadership of President Hamilton S. Amerasinghe of
Sri Lanka. ' It was with a great deal of optimism that delegates met
to seek compromise solutions for the few remaining hard-core issues.
This optimism was tempered, however, by fears of the Group of 772
that proposed national seabed mining legislation, such as that being
considered by the U.S. Congress, would disrupt the progress of the
Conference.
Mr. Carias of Honduras, Chairman of the Group of 77, voiced
this concern at the opening Plenary, noting that:
The Group of 77 has provided proof of its readiness to adopt procedures likely to produce, in a short time, the constructive results
expected of the Conference. Progress has been made in the search
for generally accepted formulas and there are broad possibilities of
attaining the objectives of the Conference in various fields of the
law of the Sea. Nevertheless, the situation as regards the international regime and machinery for the exploration and exploitation
of the seabed and ocean floor gives cause for concern; and the
Group of 77 is compelled to note once again the existence of proposed national measures and draft legislation which, although presented as transitional or provisional, are contrary to earlier positions adopted by the very States in which they are being proposed,
contrary to undertakings entered into as participants in the Conference, and contrary to international law. 3
* LL.M. 1979, University of Miami School of Law; J.D. 1975, William and Mary
Law School. Mr. Saunders attended the Eighth Session of UNCLOS held in Geneva
in March-April 1979.
1 Amerasinghe was elected President of the Conference at its first session in
Caracas in 1973 and has served in that capacity since.
2. During the first few sessions of UNCLOS, many delegations with similar interests formed special groups for negotiating and voting strength. The largest such
group, known as the Group of 77 (now composed of over 117 delegations), was
formed to give the economically underdeveloped nations participating in UNCLOS
increased power by negotiating and voting as a large block. This process also helped
to speed the negotiations, since individual spokesmen for each group could argue for
the entire group.
3. Provisional Summary Record of the 110th Plenary Meeting held in Geneva,
March 19, 1979, and recorded in U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/SR. 110, at 4 (1979).
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Mr. Carias reiterated that the concept of the "common heritage
of mankind" expressed in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749
(XXV) had attained the status of customary international law, and any
activity pursuant to national legislation was considered illegal. Carias
noted the "grave danger" such unilateral acts would have not only for
the future of UNCLOS, but also for other multilateral negotiations
between developed and developing nations..
Mr. Elliot L. Richardson, s Chairman of the U.S. Delegation,
expressed optimism for continued progress and a rapid conclusion to
the negotiations. He assured the Group of 77 that the proposed U.S.
mining legislation would not be inconsistent with the legal regime
established by the Conference. No country, particularly the United
States, preferred unilateral legislation to an international regime, according to Mr. Richardson. 6
Though optimism prevailed in the early weeks of the session, it
soon became clear that progress would be slow. In order to hasten
the negotiations, the General Committee established a Working
Group of 21 on First Committee (Seabed) Matters. The twenty-one
members of this group were selected from the numerous special interests groups in the Conference, with ten coming from the Group of
77, two from the Group of the Socialist States of Eastern Europe, and
nine from other industrialized States. 7 Alternates were appointed to
allow for rotating participation in the Working Group of 21. Their
function was to resolve the remaining deep seabed mining issues, including financial arrangements for the Authority, taxation of mining
activities, and voting on the Council.
4. It is to be noted that UNCLOS is the first attempt by the world community
as a whole to negotiate such a complex and important treaty. Should UNCLOS fail, it
is unlikely that this will again be attempted for many years. In addition, a collapse of
UNCLOS could adversely affect other existing multilateral negotiations in which the
Group of 77 is participating. This arises out of the fact that the Group of 77 has
placed a great deal of importance on UNCLOS, and is seeking through it not only an
ordering of the legal regime of the oceans, but also a restructuring of all political and
economic ties with the developed world.
5. Mr. Elliot L. Richardson is currently the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large to the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
6. See note 3 supra, at 6.
7. The Group of 21 was established as an advisory group with the function of
finding acceptable resolutions to Committee I (primarily deep seabed mining) issues
and presenting those to the Conference as a whole- According to Mr. Amerasinghe:
"The advantage of limiting the number of participants is that it would be conducive
to speedier and more intensive negotiation, while the requirement that the results
should be treated as ad referendum would ensure that all delegations have the right
to express themselves on the results emerging from the negotiations in the Group of
21." U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/BUR. 11/REV. 1, 10 April 1979, at 4-5.
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Negotiations continued on the settlement of seabed disputes
(Group of Legal Experts); the marine environment, research, and
technology (Third Committee); the continental shelf and sharing of
revenues therefrom (Negotiating Group 6); and delimitation of marine
boundaries (Negotiating Group 7).
Though a great deal of progress was made during the Geneva
segment of the Eighth Session, 8 the goal of having a draft convention
by year's end seemed unattainable. The bulk of the work of the Conference was completed prior to the Eighth Session, with over ninety
percent of the provisions of the ICNT being widely accepted. Were it
not for the remaining ten percent (mainly comprised of seabed mining issues), the ICNT would be acceptable in its present form to most
countries, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The Conference reached this stage through a unique consensus process, with no
articles being formally tested by a Conference vote. Unfortunately,
the perception developed that the accepted provisions reflected customary international law and would prevail regardless of the outcome
of the Conference. Thus, States began negotiating as if the only outstanding issues were those yet unsettled, thereby placing much
greater emphasis on these questions and making their resolution much
more difficult. Because of this increased emphasis, ideological conflicts between the developed and developing States were enhanced.
These ideological conflicts were most heatedly and vividly displayed
in the negotiations dealing with the exploitation and exploration of
the deep seabed.
Deep Seabed Mining and Technology Transfer
These philosophical conflicts go far beyond the deep seabed mining issues being negotiated in Committee One. According to Sr.
Alvaro de Soto Polar, Consejero, Permanent Mission of Peru and
Spokesman for the Group of 77:
One of the main points of conflict between developing and developed countries . . . is their different ideology. The Group of 77
is not satisfied with the status quo, and would like to change it, not
only with regard to the Law of the Sea, but also with regard to
other areas of the world economic order. Thus, the developing
countries see the negotiations in a broader context than that of just
trying to establish a regime to control exploitation of the sea. They
see it as a precedent to cooperation in other areas. 9
8. The Eighth Session was resumed in New York on July 16, 1979.
9. Speech delivered by Sr. Alvaro de Soto Polar in Geneva on April 4, 1979.

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

Leaders of the developing countries believe that the potential for
wealth from the deep seabed is great enough to enable them to end
the vicious cycle of poverty that afflicts their people. They see cooperation in exploration and the sharing of these riches as the only way
to firmly establish the new international economic order they so desperately seek. Though the future of deep seabed mining is not clear,
and the dollar value of the minerals locked inside the manganese
nodules is unknown, it is with a great deal of emotion and hope that
the negotiations in Committee One are being conducted.
One of the most difficult issues in Committee One is the issue of
the transfer of deep seabed mining technology from mining consortia
to the Enterprise or to the International Seabed Authority. The primary objective of developed and developing nations alike is to ensure
that the Enterprise operates in reality as it is designed to operate in
theory. It is generally believed that for the parallel system of exploitation to work, the Enterprise must possess the funds, personnel, and
technology to begin mining operations at the same time that mining
consortia begin commercial exploitation in the Area. To assure that
capability, negotiators long ago recognized the need to provide an
enforceable means of requiring the transfer of technology. The difficult problem has been to conceive a technology transfer plan that
would satisfy the needs of the Enterprise for technology, but would
not discourage mining companies from investing the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary for research and development of that
technology and equipment.
It was with the knowledge of these problems that UNCLOS
negotiators sought to develop a workable scheme for the transfer of
technology. Originally, Article 144 of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (hereinafter referred to as the ICNT), 10 required
that parties develop programs for technology transfer. All applicants
for mining contracts were required to negotiate "an agreement
making avilable to the Enterprise under license, the technology
used . . . in carrying out activities in the Area on fair and reasonable
terms .... " If no agreement to transfer technology could be reached,
the matter would be subjected to binding arbitration. A contractor's

10. The ICNT became the official negotiating text for the Conference at the conclusion of the Sixth Session in 1977. It is to be noted that the ICNT was merely a
negotiating text. The purpose of its publication was to provide the Conference delegates with a record of negotiated provisions in a single document so that future
negotiations and revisions of provisions would be facilitated. See U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/WP. 10, ADD. 1 (1977).
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mining rights could be suspended or terminated for failure to comply
with an arbitral award.' 1
This first attempt to reach a compromise between the interests of
the developing countries and the mining industry was not successful.
It was a clear attempt to force mining industries to transfer valuable
technology to the Enterprise without providing adequate incentives
or safeguards to industry. While industry had accepted the fact that
such technology transfer would be required, it was not willing to give
that technology away to any and all interested competitors. Again,
while the ICNT referred to transfer "under fair and reasonable
terms," it was not clear who would determine what was "fair and
reasonable." Industry foresaw that there might be a determination
under certain circumstances that a price far less than the fair market
value of the technology was "fair and reasonable." Industry was not
assured that its secrets, once they were transferred to the Enterprise,
would be protected. Further, the terms "technology" and "technology
transfer" were not defined.
In addition to these serious defects, there were two fundamental
flaws that rendered the proposal totally unacceptable. These flaws
were considered fundamental because no statutory interpretations of
or understandings about the provisions could eliminate the two problems.
The first fundamental flaw evolved from the fact that certain
components of the complex mining technology would be developed
by numerous companies not engaged in deep seabed mining. Mining
consortia might obtain that technology under license and might have
no legal right to transfer that technology to anyone. If those other
companies refused to permit transfer of their technology, it would be
impossible for mining consortia to comply with the original ICNT
provisions.
The second fundamental flaw dealt with the sanctions imposed
on mining consortia for failure to transfer technology or to comply
with a binding arbitral award. It has been estimated that the cost of
selecting, prospecting, and preparing a single mining site, keeping in
mind the banking provisions of the ICNT, would be nearly $100 million. With industry facing the possible termination of mining rights, it
was unlikely that the consortia would make the investment. Reasonable monetary, sanctions would be acceptable, but suspension or termination of mining rights would not.
11. Id. at 49-57.
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Because of these shortcomings, negotiations continued throughout the Seventh and Eighth Sessions of UNCLOS. Chairman Frank
X. Njenga commented at the Eighth Session of UNCLOS that negotiations in Negotiating Group I were conducted with two main objectives. 12 The first, and easiest, was to establish a system of exploration
and exploitation satisfactory to all concerned parties. This was easy
since all had accepted the principle that exploitation in the area
would be carried out by the Enterprise and other mining entities
licensed by the Authority. The second and most difficult objective
was to ensure the efficiency of the Enterprise and the proposed parallel mining system. The necessary equalization of two distinct entities
made this an enormous task. Chairman Njenga noted that it was
necessary to equalize the powerful mining consortia with their wealth
and technology, and the Enterprise, an entity not yet in existence
and possessing none of the tools to fulfill its purpose. The most extensive negotiations in Negotiating Group I at the Eighth Session focused on how to transfer those tools, primarily technology, to the
Enterprise. To achieve this goal, the ICNT was extensively modified.
In addition, a working definition of "technology" was prepared. 12
The first fundamental flaw was corrected. A contractor is now to
use only the technology of those who have given assurances that such
technology will be made available to the Enterprise on request of the
Authority and on fair and reasonable commercial terms. This requirement applies only if that technology is not available on the open
market. Good faith efforts by the contractor are all that is required. If
the owner of the technology refuses to honor his assurances, further
assurances by that owner are not to be accepted in awarding future
contracts. If there is a corporate relationship between the owner and
the contractor, refusal is to be considered in assessing the applicant's
qualifications for future work. This significant improvement promotes
continued use of licensed technology. 14
Technology which can be legally transferred is only required to
be so transferred if the Enterprise is unable to obtain it on the open

12. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.35 (1979).
13. Technology was defined as "The equipment and technical know-how, including manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical advice and assistance necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a system for the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the Area and the non-exclusive right to use these
items for that purpose." See U.N. Doc. NG 1/16 (1979).
14. These changes are now found in revised Article 144 and Annex II of the
ICNT and are recorded in Official Records, Volume X, Reports of the Committees
and Negotiating Groups (1978).
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market. In such cases, fair and reasonable commercial terms are required, assuring reasonable compensation to the mining companies.
Though the United States and mining consortia are basically opposed to the mandatory transfer of technology to "developing countries," the revised ICNT is a significant and acceptable improvement
on that obligation. 15 Some measure of protection is afforded
technology transferors in that only those developing countries that
have applied for a mining contract can request the technology. Transfer is conditioned on the non-availability of the technology on the
open market and its exclusive use in the reserved sections of the Area.
Article 144 now mandates the use of fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions to govern the transfer and provides the same
restrictions on technology used under license. Developing nations receiving technology must ensure that their activities "would not involve transfer of technology to a third country or the nationals of a
third country."16 This improvement should satisfy the needs of industry for protection and compensation, while providing for transfer
to developing countries.
In attempting to alleviate the second fundamental flaw, Article
144 was amended to provide that if the parties fail to reach an agreement "on the terms and conditions of transfer to the Enterprise,"17
resort to conciliation by either party is available. If no agreement is
reached, either party may refer the matter to binding arbitration
using the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (or other agreed rules). 1 8
The question to be answered by the arbitral board is whether the
contractor's offers are within the range of what is commercially fair
and reasonable. If they are not and the contractor fails to amend his
offers, the board "shall make a binding award." If other issues are
involved, reference to appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms
under the convention is provided. Penalties are provided in the event
the arbitral award is not implemented. '9
15. It is most significant that transfer of technology is conditioned on the
nonavailability of that technology on the open market and fair commercial compensation to the transferors for their technology. See Annex II, art. 5, para. 1(e), supra
note 13.
16. This provision in revised Annex II addresses a major concern of the United
States and the mining consortia. It was feared that transferred technology would
eventually fall into the hands of competitors after its transfer to developing countries.
17. See Annex II, art. 5, para. 2, supra note 13.
18. The reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (or other agreed rules)
makes it clear that the arbitration contemplated is a commercially reasonable arbitration.
19. These penalties are found in a new Article 17 of Annex II. Note 13, supra.
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As long as the contractor's offer is within the range of what is
commercially fair and reasonable, no sanction is to be imposed. 20 By
reference to commercial arbitration using the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, it is further made clear that commercial standards are to be
applied to all aspects of the arbitration procedure. Reference to the
arbitral award makes it clear that monetary awards can be made as
well as amendments to contractor's offers.
A contractor's rights can now be suspended or terminated only if,
after warnings, the contractor's activities "result in serious . .. ., persistent and wilful violations of the fundamental terms of the contract," or if the contractor fails to comply with a final and binding
dispute settlement award. However, the Authority cannot suspend or
terminate mining rights even then until after the contractor has
exhausted all of his judicial remedies. 21 In addition, the Authority
may impose monetary penalties instead of suspension or termination
of mining rights. 22
From the standpoint of United States and mining consortium interests, the new proposals are an improvement over the original
ICNT. It is most significant that a contractor's obligation to transfer
technology is now dependent upon that technology not being available on the open market. Though much of the mining technology is
sophisticated and highly complex, it is generally available for purchase by the Enterprise on the open market. This could effectively
minimize a contractor's obligations.
According to the proposals adopted at the conclusion of the
Seventh Session, mandatory transfer of technology remained an obligation of contractors even though a "fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions" standard was made applicable. This standard
could be invoked even if the technology was available on the open
market or from other sources. Revisions in Annex 1I converted this
obligation into an insurance clause, invocable only if the Enterprise
could not obtain the technology from other sources. Commercial arbitration using the UNCITRAL rules, or other prescribed rules, was
20. Note 16, supra.
21. The judicial remedies referred to are provided in the ICNT, part VI, § 6.
22. It is clear that these penalty options and protections were put, into the
revision of the ICNT to lessen the harshness of the original ICNT penalty provisions
found in Article 12 of Annex Il in the ICNT). Though industry still faces the threat
of the suspension or termination of mining rights, industry is afforded certain
safeguards before such action can be taken by the authority. Thus, the application of
"fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions" along with the exceptions in
Annex II should make these new penalty provisions acceptable to all parties.

REPORT: OCEANS

provided for in case of disputes over what was fair and reasonable.
Technology was carefully defined to guide contractors and the Enterprise.
Though contractors are still required to transfer technology to
developing countries, there are provisions prohibiting the further
transfer of that technology to other countries or entities. Though this
does give a measure of protection, it has met with some opposition
from the United States and industry representatives.
It is clear from the progress of these negotiations and the compromises reached, that sensible and sincere efforts are being made by
all parties to produce a workable and successful transfer of technology
plan. It is felt that the new provisions of the revised ICNT, though
not completely satisfactory to any interest, strike a fair balance to the
conflicting interests and are acceptable compromises.
Other Issues
The Working Group of 21, as well as Committee I, spent much
time on the politically difficult questions of the composition, powers,
functions, and voting in the organs of the Authority. Little progress
was made, and many observers felt that tough negotiations in the
future might not be successful in breaking this deadlock. The questions of decisionmaking, control of the Authority, and voting were the
most challenging issues discussed.
It is not uncommon for a large body, such as the Authority, to
select a smaller body, such as the Council, to make day to day operational decisions and to represent particular interests. Generally,
membership in, and voting in these smaller bodies is designed so that
all special interests affected by the actions of these groups are
adequately represented. It .is not realistic to expect States whose interests are directly affected to yield the power to make legally binding decisions to an international authority unless their interests are
adequately represented therein. The States, such as the United
States, whose nationals are investing billions of dollars in developing
deep seabed mining technology must have such representation on the
Council, otherwise they are not going to subject their nationals to the
dangers inherent in any legally binding control by an international
body. 23
23. The ICNT ili Articles 159-164, establishes the Council and delineates its powers, functions, and composition and provides for review of its decisions. As originally
envisioned, the Council was to be composed of thirty-six members of the Authority
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Another area of debate requiring further negotiations is the delimitation of the outer limits of the Continental Shelf and the sharing
of revenues from shelf resources beyond 200 nautical miles (n.m.)
from' the baseline. Broad margin States feel that they have a legal
right to all of the resources of the shelf that is a natural prolongation
24
of their coast, regardless of how far that prolongation may extend.
Narrow margin States feel that the shelf resources beyond 200 n.m.
of the baselines constitute a "common heritage of mankind" resource. 25 Little progress was made in Geneva in settling this issue.
elected by the Assembly. Article 159 of the ICNT provided that a certain geographical and political composition be maintained to ensure representation of various special interests. The formula provided proved to be inadequate. To satisfy those who
felt their interests were not represented, there have been subsequent proposals to
increase the number of members, to permit special interests to be represented in
certain cases, to allow for rotating memberships, and to adjust the powers and functions of the Council. To date, no satisfactory compromises have been reached. This
could prove to be one of the most difficult tasks for the Conference. Note 9, supra.
24. This claim by the broad margin States is based on -language found in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. 3, paras. 19, 63, which provided in
part that:
The court entertains no doubt (that) the most fundamental of all the
rules of law relating to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the
1958 Geneva Convention, though quite independent of it, [is] that the
right of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over rights
for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise it,
no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal
acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States have
done this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right
does not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of the
Geneva Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State
does not choose to explore or exploit the areas of shelf appertaining to it,
that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its express consent.
See H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS 465
(1978).
Article 76 of the ICNT, recognizing the concept of the "natural prolongation" of
land territory, limited the extent of the continental shelf to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 n.m. from the baseline, where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend that far.
25. According to Article 82 of the ICNT:
The coastal State shall make payments on contributions in respect of the
exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200
n.m. from the baselines. ...
This concept of revenue sharing has not met with universal acceptance. No
mechanism has been set up to ensure that such sharing is accomplished and no
means of distribution of the revenues has been established. It appears that an international authority would have to be set for this purpose, resulting in great expense to
all parties.
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It is felt by many that a distance formula 2 6 may be an acceptable
method of delimitation. The question of revenue sharing, however,
has no such simple solution and is likely to cause continuing problems
for UNCLOS.
The Third Committee spent most of its time, with little progress,
dealing with U.S. proposals governing marine scientific research. According to the United States Delegation Report, the basic objection
to existing scientific research proposals evolves out of the requirement for consent. There must be state consent prior to the conduct of
research activities on the continental shelf beyond 200 n.m. from the
baseline. It is felt by many that the U.S. objection stems from fear
that such a "consent" regime is the beginning of "creeping jurisdiction" over vast areas of the oceans traditionally considered high
seas. 27
The Marine Environment
One of the greatest achievements of UNCLOS has been the
comprehensive efforts of the Conference to protect the marine environment from pollution. According to the Chairman of Committee
III, Ambassador Alexandor Yankov of Bulgaria, the proposals now
greatly increase the prospects of consensus in the Conference, and
preliminary negotiations can now be considered closed.
These environmental provisions are significant in that, for the
first time, comprehensive environmental provisions are included in a
multilateral negotiating text that has many other political, economic,
and military reasons for support by the world community. If the
ICNT becomes a widely accepted treaty, it is certain to include these
provisions. Perhaps the most comprehensive and important of these
are the provisions dealing with vessel-source pollution. 28
If one considers the historic evolution of the world's concern for
the marine environment, and the unilateral actions being taken by
26. Some delegations have recommended distances varying from 200 n.m. to as
much as 500 n.m. from the baseline. Some intermediate figure seems likely.
27. It is felt by many that once a coastal State has even the slightest jurisdictional
authority to regulate traditionally high seas freedoms beyond 200 n.m. from the
baselines, this could lead to even greater claims of jurisdiction. To avoid this process,
the U.S. is seeking to limit coastal States' control over marine scientific research on
the continental shelf beyond 200 n.m. from the baseline.
28. Article 236 of the ICNT, as revised during the Eighth Session of UNCLOS,
provides:
States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
They shall be liable in accordance with international law.
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coastal States, it can be argued that customary international law is
developing towards a coastal State authority taking appropriate action
to prevent vessel-source pollution in all areas of the oceans. Liability
for such pollution damage may in the future be placed upon flag
States for their failure to enforce minimum manning, navigation,
operating, construction, and safety standards on vessels flying their
flags as established by the international community. In the event of
UNCLOS success, this evolutionary process will quicken.
It is clear from the progress made during the last thirty years,
and the negotiations of UNCLOS, that world concern for the marine
environment is growing. At this stage, it is unlikely that continued
and uncontrolled pollution of the oceans from any source will be
permitted. 29 While the ICNT is not a cure for all of the environmental problems of the oceans, it is at least a step in the direction of
finding such solutions. Ambassador Yankov of Bulgaria has noted that
the main features of the environmental provisions are:
1) that they enunciate the general obligations of states to protect
and preserve the marine environment, including obligations
which do not exist in other international instruments such as the
transfer of hazards from one area to another, special provisions
for ice-covered areas, preventing the introduction of alien
species, and pollution from new technology. Many of these general obligations are elaborated in the specific articles and could
serve as the basis for future international instruments as well;
2) that they sustain the global approach but incorporate important

elements of cooperation on regional bases as well;
3) that they are comprehensive both as to sources of pollution and

29. An example of the actions being taken by coastal States is found in a case
litigated in a United States District Court, and is illustrative of the growing world
concern for the marine environment. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F.
Supp. 1327 (D. P.R. 1978).
Zoe Colocotroni may well prove to be a leading case in assessing vessel-source
oil pollution liability. This in rein and in personam admiralty suit brought by the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its primary environmental agency, the Environmental Quality Board (EQB), sought recovery for pollution damage and clean-up
cost pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901), the Water Pollution Control Act of Puerto Rico (24 L.P.R.A. § 591), and the Public Policy Environmental Act of Puerto Rico (12 L.P.R.A. § 1121).
The court held the defendants, the SS Zoe Colocotroni, her owners, and her
underwriters liable for the estimated market value of 92,109,720 marine animals
killed by the Colocotroni Oil Spill, the replacement costs of $559,500 for destroyed
mangroves, and $78,108.89 for actually expended clean-up costs. Discretionary prejudgment interest was also awarded. These awards were made after a factual determination that the accidental grounding of the SS Zoe Colocotroni was a result of the
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as to preventive, protective and enforcement measures. The latter include requirements that national measures take into account, or be no less stringent than international rules, standards,
practices and procedures, and those for liability and compen0
sation.
The Ambassador has stated that, if the ICNT is treated as a general
frame work and considered in conjunction with the instruments of
IMCO and other bodies with a role in the protection and preservation of the marine environment, then it is a reliable instrument for
promoting international cooperation towards this end. Its purpose is
that of a framework, and not as an instrument to be used in isolation.
It should be seen as a starting point for the fiture growth and elaboration of international law.
It is hoped that conventional and customary international law will
continue to develop in a manner that takes into account the value
and the vulnerability of the marine environment. The UNCLOS
negotiations have certainly accelerated the process of the evolution of
customary international law in this area and have served to educate
the world community on the richness of the oceans as well as the
fragility of many of its ecosystems. With the provisions of the ICNT/
Rev. 1 and the cautions of Ambassador Yankov that this is only a
beginning, there is still hope that the oceans will be preserved for
many future generations.
Conclusion
Though the goal of producing a draft convention by year's end is
not likely to be met, progress was made in Geneva. By convening the
Collegium 3 1 under the rules of the Conference, President

vessel's unseaworthiness at the beginning of its voyage and the negligent operation of
the vessel by its master and crew.
Though the final appeals of this case have not yet been completed, the extent of
the defendants' liability as determined by the district court may signal the standard
to be applied in all future vessel-source pollution actions within the United States.
30. Speech delivered by Ambassador Alexandor Yankov of Bulgaria in Geneva on
April 18, 1979.
31. During the closing hours of the Geneva portion of the Eighth Session of
UNCLOS, it became apparent that a consensus could not be reached on the question
of the distribution of a revised negotiating text containing the three Committee reports. To break that deadlock, President Amerasinghe called a meeting of the Collegium to decide whether a revised ICNT could be distributed in New York at the
resumed session. The Collegium, composed of the Conference President and the
three Committee Chairmen, met for that purpose, resulting in the preparation and
distribution of the ICNT/Revision I.
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Amerasinghe was able to ensure that a redraft of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (known as the ICNT/Revision 1) would be
prepared and distributed when the Eighth Session of UNCLOS resumed in New York. It is felt that the mood of the Conference is now
conducive to rapid progress, and that this maneuver by the Conference leadership should hasten the negotiating progress. All things
considered, a draft convention should be ready by the end of next
year.

